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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MONOTONE PROCESSES
REVIEWED THROUGH AN INEFFICIENCY MEASURE*
GILBERT RITSCHARD
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of any allocation mechanism is to improve the initial
situation given by the endowments of the agents. For classical
convex economies with price systems, the competitive process looks
to be the best such mechanism. Indeed, from the New-Welfare
Theorems of Arrow, Debreu, and Koopmans, we know that it
achieves Pareto-efficient allocations. It is also well-known that the
competitive mechanism is individually rational, i.e., the competi-
tive equilibrium makes the position of each individual at least as
good as his initial endowment (see, for instance, the nice book of
Hildenbrand and Kirman [1976], where it is shown that the
competitive equilibria belong to the core of the economy). Further-
more, the competitive mechanism is uniquely informationally
efficient [Mount and Reiter, 1979; Jordan, 1982] which means, in
particular, that it requires a minimal message space.
Despite all these nice properties of the competitive mecha-
nism, other processes are of interest, especially for environments
where the competitive allocation process does not work, or at least
loses some of the above-mentioned properties. If we except the
problems of nonconvexities due to indivisibilities, externalities,
etc., these situations correspond mainly to the cases where there
are no free prices (see, for instance, Chapter 7 in Balasko [1988]) or
no prices at all. Think of planned economies, or of economies with
public goods.
As far as decentralized processes are concerned, the agents
must indeed get some information from the market, but the
absence of a free price system here prevents the use of price signals.
The messages sent to the agents must be of some other type and
will generally take the form of quantity signals. Thus, the alloca-
tion mechanism without prices is commonly viewed as a system in
which some central board proposes successively feasible allocations
to the agents until an equilibrium is reached. At each step the
propositions are naturally revised according to the agents' reac-
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tion. In the well-known MDP [Malinvaud, 1970; Dreze and de la
Vallee Poussin, 1971] process, for instance, the agents transmit to
the central board their marginal rates of substitution evaluated at
the proposed allocation.
Now, if we accept the idea that each agent is free to reject a
proposed allocation, we can reasonably consider that he will do so
for any proposition that makes him worse off compared with the
previous one. The allocation mechanism can then only generate
sequences of allocations along which the satisfaction of every agent
is increasing or, at least, not decreasing. In that sense, such
allocation mechanisms are called monotone processes.
Clearly, these processes based upon allocation signals are
informationally much less efficient than mechanisms with price
signals. Indeed, with m agents, the allocation space, i.e., the board's
message space, has dimension (m — 1)/ as opposed to / — 1 for the
price space. And this is without considering the agents' response
space whose dimension, for instance, in the MDP process, equals
m(/ — 1), i.e., the dimension of the total message space of the
competitive mechanism. What about other properties?
The monotonicity requirement, which is expressed as an
exchange axiom in Smale [1976], obviously implies the individual
rationality of the mechanism. It is indeed a stronger property since
it concerns every couple of successive allocation signals, while
individual rationality expresses just the dominance of the final
allocation over the initial endowments. It must be emphasized that
the monotonicity property only makes sense for mechanisms that
generate sequences of feasible allocations. This, for instance, is not
the case of the competitive process.
From the point of view of social welfare, the crucial question is
that of the accessibility of Pareto optima. On this point, monotonic-
ity, together with the usual convexity and smoothness assumptions
on preferences, ensures important properties. Smale [1973], for
instance, has first demonstrated the accessibility and the stability
of Pareto optima (see also Cornet [1981]), while Schecter [1977], in
a very arduous paper, has established the finite length of monotone
exchange curves.
The main goal of this note is to put forth the fundamentals of
monotone processes. We therefore give a simplified and unified
presentation of these results. For instance, we shall not consider
Smale's problems of nonconvexities, nor shall we, contrary to
Schecter, bother with the difficulties arising at the frontier of the
commodity space. Our simplified setting consists then of a pure
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exchange economy with the standard assumptions on preferences,
and concerns only the interior behavior of continuous monotone
processes.
The unified, and as a consequence also simplified, aspect of the
presentation results from an extensive use of an allocation ineffi-
ciency measure which has first been introduced by Balasko [1982].
It is shown that the gradient of this measure defines a differen-
tiable monotone process which establishes existence of such mech-
anisms. This measure is then shown to be a Liapounov function for
monotone processes from which convergence to and stability of
Pareto optima follow directly. Then, and this is the main point of
the note, the inefficiency measure suggests a suitable substitution
of variable that facilitates the demonstration of the finite length of
the exchange curves generated by monotone processes.
Allocation mechanisms without prices are of special interest in
planning problems involving production and public goods. In a
concluding section, we then briefly explain how the approach
followed in the paper easily extends to these cases.
II. THE FORMAL SETTINGS
We consider pure exchange economies with 1 commodities and
m agents, but without price system. Let x i = (4,4, . . . , o4) denote a
commodity bundle of agent i. The preferences of every agent i are
then represented by a utility function u i :R 1 --> R; x i ---> u i (x i ), which
is (1) differentiable up to any order; (2) differentiably increasing
(i.e., au i (xi )/axi > 0 for every j = 1,2, . . . , 1); and (3) differentiably
strictly quasi-concave, such that the set ul l ([c,00]) is strictly convex
for every real number c.
Let r E R 1 be the vector of total resources that are assumed
constant. Then, X = = (x 1 ,x2, , xm ) E Rim 1/, x i = r} denotes
the set of the feasible allocations. The set X is obviously a smooth
manifold of dimension /(m — 1). The Pareto-efficient allocations in
X, i.e., the allocations x E X for which there is no x' E X such that
u i (x i ) ) with at least one strict inequality for every i, form, in
X, a submanifold of dimension m — 1. We denote this submanifold
by P.
An allocation process without prices is a smooth vector field
*:X --> Rim; x --> i(x) = (41(x),4i2(x), , 4i m(x)) with Cx) = 0.
The vector i(x) indeed gives the direction of the change in the
proposed allocation that occurs at the point x. The condition
1 iii(x) = 0 ensures at each step that the resulting proposal remains
feasible and unwasteful with respect to total resources.
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Let the map x: [0,00) —> X; t x(t) be the solution of the system
of differential equations: x '(t) = 4(x), when the initial condition is
x(0) = w, with 0) E X standing for the vector of initial endowments.
This curve can be thought of as resulting from a sequence of small
trades. Thus, we call it an exchange or trade curve.
A monotone process is a process such that the satisfaction of
every agent increases (one at least strictly) along every exchange
curve. To put this formally, first note that, from the assumptions
made on the utility functions u i, the satisfaction of consumer i
increases strictly in the direction 41(x) if and only if we have
grad u i (xi ) • i(x) > 0. For grad u i (x i ) • *i(x) = 0, strict quasi
concavity implies a decrease in u i , unless i(x) is zero; i.e., unless
agent i is not affected by the change in the allocation at x. Thus, a
continuous allocation mechanism qJ is a monotone process if and
only if at any point x of X the vector i(x) belongs to the set,
C(x) = 1y = (Y1 Y2, • • • .Ym) E
yi = 0, grad u i (x i ) • y i > 0 or yi = 0, each i}.
It is readily shown [Smale, 1976] that C(x) is a (neither open
nor closed) convex cone and that we have C(x) = {0} if and only if x
is Pareto optimal. Assuming that some change occurs when x
admits a Pareto superior allocation, i.e., t(x)  0 if C(x) {0}, this
last property implies that the equilibria of monotone processes are
given by the set P of the Pareto optima.
III. ALLOCATION INEFFICIENCY AND THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF
MONOTONE PROCESSES
The new approach followed in this note for studying the
dynamics of monotone processes is based upon Balasko's [1982]
inefficiency measure. In this section we first introduce the measure
and its properties. We then give the direct consequences of these
properties, namely, the existence of smooth monotone processes,
convergence to Pareto optima, and the local asymptotic stability of
these optima.
Given a point x of X, we consider the set of the allocations that
dominate it; i.e., that are Pareto superior to x:
K(x) = = (5e bie2, „Yin) E . u i (x j ),i = 1,2, . . . , m}.
Clearly, for quasi-concave utility functions, K(x) is a compact
convex subset of X. We call it a lens because of its shape in the case
of two goods and two agents.
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Now, consider in X the Lebesgue measure of the lens K(x), i.e.,
its volume. This measure, denoted p..(x), can be thought of as the
number of allocations Pareto superior to x. In that sense, it reflects
the degree of inefficiency of the allocation x.
Obviously, from the smoothness of the utility functions the
inefficiency measure 1.1:X --> R + , is also smooth. Furthermore, we
have
LEMMA 1. Assume a pure exchange economy with preferences
represented by smooth, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-
concave utility functions u i . Then, the inefficiency measure
g,(x) is such that
(a) [L(x) = 0 if x is in P, and R(x) > 0 otherwise;
(b) for any exchange curve t ---> x(t) of a monotone process,
µ' (t) < 0 when x(t) is not in P;
hence, since P is the set of equilibria of monotone processes,
p,(x) is a Liapounov function for such processes;
(c) the vector fields — grad pi(x) defines a smooth monotone
process.
Proof of Lemma 1. For point (a), first note that, for strictly
quasi-concave u i 's, a Pareto-efficient point x is the sole element of
K(x). This implies that Ii(x) = 0. The Lebesgue measure is by
definition nonnegative. It then remains to show that ii(x) is
nonzero outside the Pareto optima. For ii(x) to be nonzero, the lens
K(x) has to be of dimension /(m — 1). This is the case if K(x) has a
nonempty interior. Here, note that the interior of the set C(x)
defined in Section II is the interior of the tangent cone of K(x) at x.
We then can, since K(x) is compact and convex with our assump-
tions, equivalently check that the interior of C(x) is not empty. This
interior is given by the intersection of the open subspaces defined
by the inequalities grad u i (x i ) • yi > 0. Now, this intersection is not
empty if the 1 hyperplanes grad u i (x i ) • y i = 0 are not confounded.
This is the case if at least two gradient vectors grad u i are not
collinear; i.e., if x is not in P. Part (a) is thus proved.
Point (b) is quite obvious. Indeed, for x = x(t) and being a
monotone process, x '(t) = tgx(t)) lies in C(x) by definition. Like-
wise, we have x'(t) 0 when x is a nonoptimal allocation. Then,
moving from x into the direction x '(t) leads to a Pareto superior
point x in K(x). Then we have K(5e) C K(x) which implies that
11(5e) < gx). Thus, p strictly decreases which proves part (b).
Finally, let us turn to part (c). Since from the smoothness of
the u i's is smooth, the function g:x ---> —grad gx) is also smooth
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on X. When li,(x) is not zero, i.e., from (a), outside P, it is always
possible to move somewhere inside K(x) and so reduce 11,(x). Thus,
—grad p.,(x) has to be nonzero when x is not Pareto optimal. It then
remains to show that —grad ii(x) belongs to the cone C(x) for any x
in X. Let g(x) = (gi (x i ), g2(x2 ),	 , gni(x,i )) denote the vector
—grad 11(x). Clearly, we have 8i (xi )= 0. Furthermore, if gi (xi ) is
not zero, then —grad u i (xi ) • gi (xi ) is strictly positive. Otherwise,
indeed, a displacement in the direction —grad 11(x) would lead to a
lower indifference surface for agent i, which is contradictory with
the maximal decrease in 11(x). Thus, g(x) lies in C(x), and (c) is
proved.
Q.E.D.
It follows from properties (a) and (b) that the inefficiency
measure pd is a Liapounov function for monotone processes. The
characterization of the Liapounov function used here, however,
differs somewhat from the usual one. Indeed, we have adapted the
definition for the case of a continuum of equilibria that we have to
deal with. One has then to be warned about a direct application of
Liapounov's stability theorem as stated in Hirsch and Smale [1974,
p. 193]. In our case the Liapounov function does not ensure the
stability of an equilibrium x in P. It implies the stability of the
connected subset P of X in the sense that, for each neighborhood V
of P in X, there is a neighborhood U of P in X such that every
trajectory starting in U remains in V.
Along the same way, we have to make precise the notion of
asymptotic stability for the case of a continuum of equilibria.
Indeed, the usual definitions, like the one given in Hirsch and
Smale [1974, p. 186], also implicitly assume isolated equilibria. The
natural extension [Smale, 1973] is
DEFINITION. Let P be a continuum of equilibria. Then x E P is
locally asymptotically stable if P is stable (in the sense stated
above) and if for every neighborhood V of x in P there is a
neighborhood U of x in X such that every solution x(t) with x(0)
in U is defined and converges to an equilibrium in V.
In other words, this means that any solution curve that starts
near an equilibrium x E P converges to an equilibrium close to x.
We can now state the properties of monotone processes that
are direct consequences of Lemma 1.
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THEOREM 2. Assume a pure exchange economy with preferences
represented by smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-
concave utility functions u i . Then,
(a) smooth monotone processes exist;
(b) let x: [0,00) ---> X; t -> x(t) be a monotone exchange curve
starting at x(0) = E X; then, lim,x(t) exists and is a Pareto
optimum;
(c) the Pareto-optimal allocations are locally asymptotically
stable for monotone processes.
Proof of Theorem 2. Property (a) results from the existence of
the inefficiency measure and from Lemma 1 (c).
From Lemma 1 (b) we have '(t) < 0, for x 0 P. Thus, as t ->
00, the function pd converges to its absolute minimum which is zero,
i.e., lim,gx(t)) = 0. But this limit is equal to glim t_>.x(t)) which
implies that lim,x(t) exists. Furthermore, it equals zero if and
only if limt_>.x(t) is Pareto optimal. This ends the proof of part (b).
The stability of P follows from the existence of the Liapounov
function p.. Next, consider a neighborhood V of an efficient
allocation in P. Let U be any lens K(x) such that K(x) n P is a
subset of V. Since any monotone exchange curve starting in K(x)
lies in K(x), and converges to a point of P, it converges to an
equilibrium in Pn U C V. Part (c) is thus proved.
Q.E.D.
IV. FINITE LENGTH OF THE EXCHANGE CURVES
We have now established that monotone processes always lead
to Pareto optima and that these optima are locally asymptotically
stable. For the achievement of optima to be interesting from the
economic point of view, it has to be realizable into a finite lapse of
time. Mathematically, this property of finite time corresponds to
the finite length of the trajectories that lead from any allocation x
in X to Pareto optima. The following theorem is then essential to
give economic significance to the results of the preceding section.
THEOREM 3. Assume a pure exchange economy with preferences
represented by smooth, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-
concave utility functions u i . Then, a monotone exchange curve
[0,00) ----> X, t -> x(t), with x(0) = 0), has finite length for any 0) E
X.
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Proof of Theorem 3. The length of the exchange curve is given
by
length x([0,00)) = f: Ilx V)Ildt,
where Ill denotes the usual Euclidean norm. One has then to show
that this integral is definite. We proceed (see Schecter [1977] for an
alternative proof) through a parameterization of the length of the
path x([0,71 ]) by the inefficiency measure of x(T ), i.e. the Lebesgue
measure p, of the lens K(x(T )). Let s : [0,00) ---> R, pt, -> s(p), be this
parameterization. This function can be thought of as the geometri-
cal relationship between the path x[0,71 ]) and the volume reduction
Ro — ii, of the lens, where p = gx(0)). Economically, it can be
interpreted as giving the time needed to reach an allocation of
inefficiency ii, < N.
Clearly, the function s is smooth on (0,00), since x(•) and Re) are
themselves smooth. Furthermore, s is strictly decreasing.
The length of the exchange curve x([0,00)) is 5(0). Thus, the
theorem will be proved if we establish that
s(0) = lim f " Is '(1) Idp, < + 00.iti—o m
This is done by showing that there exists a strictly positive E
such that
(a) Is'(01 ^ k,	 if pL, > €,
(b) Is '(1-)1 ^ Cµ -a, with 0 ^ a < 1,	 if ii, < E,
where c and k are finite positive constants.
Point (a) is true for every E > 0 since the map s is smooth on
(0,00).
For point (b), note first that s ' (11,) = s ' (t) I 1.L' (t), where s ' (t) =
11(x(0)11 and til(t) are the derivatives of s and II, with respect to the
time t. Now, we have
(1)	 1p.,' WI = —grad gx(t)) • OW)
= cos 0(t) - grad gx(t))11 • s '(t),
where 0(t) is the angle between —grad gx(t)) and qi(x(t)). From
Lemma 1, I W(t) I is strictly positive if x(t) is not Pareto efficient
which implies that cos 0(t) is strictly positive. Let Omax denote the
maximum of 0(t) on the portion of the exchange curve defined by
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ii, < E and Ilx(t) — lim x(t)11 > 0. From the strict quasi concavity of
the utility functions u i, cos O max is strictly positive. Since both
grad Ii(x) and tgx) equal zero for x Pareto efficient, we have
I W (t) I  cos Oma,, • ilgrad ji,(x(t))11 • s ' (t)
and then
s
 ' (t) (2)	 I s '( 1)1 — 1W(t)I ^ (cos ()max • Iliadgx(t))10 -1 .
To establish point (b), we have then to study the relationship
between 11 grad ii II and il in the neighborhood of the optimum X' =
limt_. x(t). Since je is Pareto efficient (Theorem 2), we know, from
Lemma 1, that pL,(x) = 0 and grad p.,(Oe) = 0. Thus, in a neighborhood
of 1, a Taylor-Young expansion, respectively, to the second order
for ii(x) and to the first order for grad p(x), gives
p,(x) = 1 t (x — i')H(x — o'c')
grad 11(x) = H(x — x),





ij = 1,2, . . . , lm.
H is symmetrical. Furthermore, it is positive definite since p,
reaches a minimum at je. Thus, there exists an orthogonal matrix C
such that H = C AtC , where A is the diagonal matrix of the
(nonnegative) eigenvalues Xi, i = 1,2, . . . , /m of H. Let z =
(z 1 ,z2, . . . , zim ) denote the vector tC(x — oC). Then
	1 	 1 ,
gx) = — tzAz = — 24 2
22
and
II rad RII = (tzA2z)1/2 = 1 x2z2 1/2 .
Since P is a submanifold of dimension m — 1 in X C Rim and
grad tl(x) is nonzero for x 0 P, H has some strictly positive
eigenvalues. Let X min be the smallest such nonzero eigenvalue.
Then we have 1 XM  Xmin Xiz 2 = Xmin2p, and in a neighborhood
of R. = 0:
I lgrad RI > (2Xmin ) 1/211 1/2.
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Together with the inequality (2) this gives
Is '(01 <
	 with c = (cos Oma, • (2Xmin) 1/2)-1.
The angle ()max being strictly less that 7/2 and Amin being
different from zero, the constant c is finite and positive. Point (b) is
thus proved.
Finally, we then have
s (0) c foe µ-1/2dµ+k f m d
Clearly, the integrals in the right-hand side are definite, and so
is s (0). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Q.E.D.
Remark. Theorem 3 ensures that wherever a monotone ex-
change curve starts, it converges in finite time to a Pareto
optimum. It says nothing more, however, about the speed of
convergence. From the equations (1) and (2) in the proof, we see
that the length of the exchange path does not depend upon the
length of the vectors tli(x). It is only determined by the angles 0(t)
and by the length of the gradients of the inefficiency measure along
the path. Thus, the shortest exchange path will be obtained when
(i) the norms II grad gx (t)) II are large and (ii) the vectors i(x) are
close to the gradients grad ii(x) so as to render the angles 0(t) small.
This last condition then suggests that the process — grad p, should
be among the more efficient ones.
V. ECONOMIES WITH PRODUCTION AND PUBLIC GOODS
Until now, we have considered monotone processes in pure
exchange economies only. Note, however, that the results can be
extended to economies with production and public goods without
great difficulties. We give just a few indications about it.
First, we characterize an economy with public goods and
production. We consider h public goods. Let xp , xi E R l+h denote a
commodity bundle of consumer i. The amounts xp of public goods in
these bundles must be the same for each consumer i. The
preferences are then represented by utility function u i : R 1 + 1' ---> R,
(xp ,xi ) —> u i (xp ,xi ). We still assume that the functions u i are smooth,
differentiably increasing in each argument and strictly quasi
concave. Concerning production, we consider n firms. Let y j E R
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denote the net output of private goods of firm j and yip E Rh its
output of public goods. The efficient production set is defined by n
implicit functions fj (yip — xp,y; ) = 0, j = 1,2, . . . , n, where the
functions f FR 1+h -> R, are smooth, nondecreasing in all the
arguments and strictly convex.
Let
E R(l+n)h+(m+n)1 
with ypz = (xp ,yp ,x,y)
= (y ip . . . 9 ynp ) and y = (y i ,y2 , . . . yn )
denote a program in that economy. For resources rp E Rh in public
goods and r E R 1 in private goods the set of feasible programs is
Z= {,Z R(1+n)h-F(m+n)ii xp = y jp 	rp,
Xi = yi + rifi (yip — xp ,y;) = 0, j = 1 9 2 9 ... , n}.
Clearly, Z is a smooth manifold of dimension nh + (m + n —
1)1 — n. The study of monotone processes for economies with
public goods and production as just described requires that the set
Z be considered instead of the allocation set Z. Furthermore, the
lenses to be considered are
K(z) = = (ip Sp ,3c-,57) E ZI
	
u i (o7p ,o7i )	 u i (xp ,xi ), each i = 1,2, ... m}.
Monotone processes are then defined by smooth vector fields
: z R(n+l)h+(n+m)1 ; z --> t(z), such that t(z) belongs to the set:
C(Z) = {w = (Vp ,Vi, • • • , V„,Wi, • • • , Wm+n ) E R (l+n)h+(m+n)1 I
v i E R h ,w i E R l , vp + v i = 0, w i = 0,
grad u i (xp ,xi ) • (vp ,w i) > 0 or (vp ,w i ) = 0,
each i = 1,2, .	 , m}.
Now, to extend the approach followed in this paper, it remains
to define the appropriate inefficiency measure. Consider the natu-
	ral projection 7:R(1+ n)h+(m+n)1	 Rh-ml ; z = (Xp,yp ,X,y) —>(Xp,X).
Clearly, 7(K(z)) is a compact subset of Tr(Z). A legitimate ineffi-
ciency measure of a program z is then given by the Lebesgue
measure pi, of Tr(K(z)) as a subset of Tr(Z). In the same way we
define 13„ as the natural projection of the set of Pareto optima with
production. For establishing the properties of monotone processes,
one then checks that the map II,: z —> p.,(z) has the same properties
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with respect to P„ as the map ti, has with regard to P. Similar
demonstrations as those given in this note then follow.
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